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I INTRODUCTION 
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. I.) 
Garrett Hardin's famous piece, The Tragedy of the Commons, 2 is a sombre 
reminder that the vast majority of natural resources are finite. Regimes of open access to 
natural resources (referred to by Hardin as the 'freedom of the commons') have 
subsequently been replaced with regimes of statutorily-created property rights, 
'commoditising' resources to enable their sustainable development. However, as a public 
good, any property rights created in natural resources must continue to be constrained by 
the greater social interest. 
New Zealand currently does not confer property rights in natural resources which 
fall under the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA). This is expressly recognised 
within the RMA itself.3 Instead, a system for the management of resources is provided, 
with a focus on decentralisation of decision-making powers to local and regional 
authorities. This paper focuses on the adequacy of this current regime and whether 
property rights are required to achieve certain social objectives, in respect of freshwater 
resources. 4 
To this end, a discussion of the current regime under the RMA leads the author to 
conclude that greater security of rights in water is required in New Zealand. The decision 
in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd 5 is cited as an example of the inadequacies 
of the 'first in, first served' approach to water allocation under the current regime, and it 
2 Garrett Hardin " The Tragedy of the Commons" Science ( 13 December 1968). 
3 Resource Management Act 1991 s 122. Section 122 states that a resource consent is " neither real nor 
personal property." 
4 In respect to the term ' freshwater ' the definition provided for by section 2 of the Resource Management 
Act 199 I is adopted , that is, ' freshwater ' means ' all water except coastal water and geothermal water 
resources'. In addition , the use of the term 'freshwater' is limited largely in this paper to water flows of 
river systems, rather than static water resources such as lakes. 
5 A oraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd (30 ovember 2004) HC Timaru Cl V 2003 476 000733 
Chisholm and Harrison JJ. 
) 
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is recognised that the trade of water rights (which would promote the movement of water 
from low value to high value uses) is grossly under-utilised. 
In determining the approach in which New Zealand show now take, the 
experiences of other property rights regimes are drawn upon, namely the Australian 
approach to freshwater resources allocation, and the New Zealand fisheries regime of 
' property ' rights. Under both regimes discussed, property rights in natural resources are 
viewed as essential to promote the efficient allocation of resources to high value uses, 
whilst encouraging more investment in those resources. 
Applied to the context of freshwater resources in New Zealand, the conclusion is 
reached that first, before any attempt to establish a property regime in freshwater 
resources is made, Crown ownership over (and therefore authority to control) those 
resources must be determined vis-a-vis Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi. Otherwise 
freshwater resources must continue to be managed , not owned privately. 
Secondly, whilst the application of 'propet1y' as a traditional paradigm is 
infeasible in regulating a public good such as freshwater resources given the overarching 
social interests in such resources, ' property' as a gradated sense of rights based upon 
relative exercises of control over resource is desirable and necessary if water is to be 
allocated and managed efficiently and in a sustainable manner. 
Although the RMA expressly rejects the notion that resource consents are 
property, significant elements of property are evident in the legislation , suggesting that 
perhaps a legislative overhaul is not essential. Instead, what may be required is a 
concerted effo11 at the regional and local levels to enhance the security of rights as 
registrable instruments, and the promotion of greater transferability of those rights under 
comprehensive regional plans. 
' 
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II THE CURRENT NEW ZEALAND FRAMEWORK 
The current New Zealand framework for rights in water has its ongms m the 
English common law riparian doctrine. Derived from land ownership, riparian rights 
permitted usufructuary access and use of surface water flow to the middle of a river 
(known as the ad medium filum aquae doctrine).6 Like other common law jurisdictions, 
New Zealand sought to better manage increasing conflicts over water use and degrading 
water quality through legislative intervention. 7 
Riparian doctrine was largely extinguished under the Water and Soil Conservation 
Act 1967 (the WSCA) which vested the exclusive rights to take, divert, and dam water in 
the Crown.8 Apart from limited statutory rights, 9 no person had a right to take, use or 
divert water without the written consent of the Minister. 10 
A The Resource Management Act 1991 
The WSCA was both repealed and replaced by the current legislative regime for 
resource management in New Zealand, the Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA). 
The RMA adopts the vesting provision of the WSCA, and provides limited statutory 
rights to take and use water for domestic and stock purposes 11 plus for a limited number 
of other purposes. 12 All other uses are permitted only if they are provided for under a 
regional plan or granted via a resource consent issued by a local authority. 13 
In consideration of whether or not to grant a resource consent under the RMA, a 
local authority is to have regard to the purposes and principles of the RMA, of which the 
6 Hinde, McMorland, & Sim Butterworths Land Law in l\'ew Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 
para 2.232. 
7 Joshua Getzler A llisto,y of ll 'ater Rights at Common Law (Oxford University Press , ew York, 2004) 
44. 
8 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 s 21 (I). 
9 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 s 21 (I). 
10 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 s 21 (IA) . 
11 Resource Management Act 1991 ss 3( b) and ( e ). 
12 Those purposes include: to exercise recognised customary activities by Maori (section 17 A); the use of 
geothermal waters by tangata whenua (section 14(3)(c)); and for fire-fighting purposes (section 14(3}(e)). 
13 Resource Management Act 1991 s 3(a). 
6 
promotion of sustainable management is to be the paramount consideration. 14 Matters of 
national importance must also be recognised and provided for. 15 These matters include 
the preservation of the natural character of lakes and rivers, 16 the relationship of Maori 
and their culture with water and taonga, 17 and the protection of recognised customary 
activities. 18 
Other matters that decision makers must have particular regard to include 
kaitiakitanga (stewardship), 19 the efficient use and development of resources, 20 the 
maintenance and enhancement of the quality of the environment, 21 and the benefits of 
renewable energy.
22 
Further, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi must be taken into 
account. 
23 
Despite the array of considerations that must be accounted for however, in 
reality permits are granted upon a 'first come, first served' basis.24 
A resource consent may be granted for a duration of up to 35 years,25 with the 
possibility of review according to conditions specified in the consent, 26 or in order to 
enable the levels, flows, rates or standards of water set in a regional plan to be met, 27 or 
when required by new national environmental standards set under the RMA. 28 No 
provision for compensation exists under the RMA to account for the reduction or 
extinguishment of rights. 
14 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 5( I). 
15 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 6 . 
16 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 6(a). 
17 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 6(e) . 
18 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 6(g). 
19 
Resource Management Act 199 I s 7(a). ' Kaitiakitanga ' is defined under section 2 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 as meaning, ' the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area in 
accordance with tikanga Maori in relation to natural and physical resources; and includes the ethic of 
stewardship .' 
20 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 7(b ). 
2 1 
Resource Management Act 199 I s 7(t). 
22 
Resource Management Act 199 I s 7U). 
23 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 8. 
24 
Ford , Butcher, Edmonds , & Braggins Economic Efficiency of Water A/location MAF Technical Paper 
No. 200 I /7 Prepared for MAF Policy (November 200 I, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington) 
18 . 
25 
Resource Management Act 1991 s I 23(d). 
26 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 128(1)(a). 
27 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 128( I )(b ). 
28 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 128( I )(ba). 
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A water permit, as a resource consent, is owned separately from title to land and 
may therefore be transferred in whole or in part to any occupier or owner in respect of 
which the permit is granted ,29 and to another person on another site, or to another site, if 
both sites are within the same catchment, aquifer, or geothermal field. 30 The transfer of a 
water permit is however qualified by the requirement that the transfer must be expressly 
provided for in a regional plan and be approved by the relevant consent authority. 31 
B Discussion of the Present Framework 
From a property rights perspective, the RMA expressly rejects any notion that a 
resource consent is either real or personal property. 32 Instead, from the outset, the RMA 
has focussed solely on the management of resources. A significant influence in the 
reluctance of the New Zealand government to create rights of ownership in natural 
resources most likely stemmed from Maori sentiment that questions of ownership under 
the Treaty of Waitangi were to be settled outside of a legislative framework. 33 Maori 
were of the view that before any question of management of natural resources arose, the 
question of ownership of those resources must first be settled. 34 
Difficulties have arisen in the absence of clearly defined property rights in water 
resources however. The events surrounding the disputed rights of users in the Waitaki 
29 Resource Management Act 1991 ss 136( I) and (2). 
30 Resource Management Act 1991 s 136(2). 
3 1 Resource Management Act 1991 s 136(2). 
32 This is stated under section 122 of the Resource Management Act 1991 . Although this paper will 
progress on the footing that water rights under the RMA are not ' property ', due to the clearly expressed 
will of Parliament, it is suggested that absent section 122 there would be a very strong argument that a 
water permit does confer a right in ' property' over a resource . The concept of ' property ' with respect to 
natural resources will be discussed further below. 
33 Morris Te Whiti Love "Ten Years of the Resource Management Act for Maori" Speech delivered to the 
Resource Management Law Association, Auckland Branch (Resource Management Law Association , 
Auckland , 6 December 2001 ). 
34 Janine Hayward The Trealy Challenge: local Government and Maori An Overview Report 
Commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust (2002 , Crown Forestry Rental Trust, Wellington) 44. 
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Catchment provide a good illustration of those difficulties, litigated at the High Court in 
the case of Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd.35 
I Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian 
The Aoraki decision concerned the application by the Aoraki Water Trust to 
obtain a resource consent (in the form of a water permit) from the Canterbury Regional 
Counsel (the CRC) to take and divert water from Lake Tekapo for agricultural irrigation 
purposes. Meridian had established structures in place (under long-standing resource 
consents) for the intake and control of water for electricity generation purposes, slightly 
' down lake' of Aoraki's proposed taking site. 36 
Meridian was in opposition to Aoraki ' s application , claiming that the water in the 
Waitaki Catchment was already fully allocated. 37 Meridian argued the principles of non-
derogation from grant, and legitimate expectation of non-erosion by future grant meant 
that the CRC could not issue new water permits inconsistent with Meridian ' s existing 
rights , which were acquired on a, ' first-come, first-served' basis.38 It was submitted that a 
water permit was a valuable right, not merely a permission or privilege, as argued by 
Aoraki. 39 
The Court found that, whilst a permit 1s not real or personal property (as 
expressed in the RMA) , 
40 
the CRC could not derogate from the existing rights of 
Meridian by granting later inconsistent grants and Meridian possessed a legitimate 
expectation that its rights would not be eroded. The Court reasoned that, unless principles 
of non-derogation and legitimate expectation were applied to an existing permit, the 
sustainable management objectives of the RMA would be defeated by later inconsistent 
35 
, loraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd (30 November 2004) HC Timaru CIV 2003 476 000733 
Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
36 
Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd, above n 32, para I Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
37 
Aoraki lf'ater Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd, above n 32, para 2 Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
38 
Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd, above n 32, para 23 Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
39 
Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd, above n 32, para 23 Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
40 
Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd, above n 32, para 26 Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
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grants. 41 Consequently, approving the 'first-in, first-served' approach to resource 
allocation,42 the Court held that the pre-existing rights holder "enjoys an exclusive right to 
the resource."43 
With the decision in Aoraki effectively signalling that the Waitaki Catchment was 
a fully allocated resource, the Government acted contrary to the RMA 's philosophy of 
governmental non-interference in individual cases44 and exercised the call-in powers of 
the Minister over all pending resource consent applications under the RMA.
45 In the 
absence even of a regional plan to deal with the future administration of the Catchment, 
the Resource Management (Waitaki Catchment) Amendment Act 2004 was then enacted, 
creating an independent Board to formulate a regional plan for the allocation of water in 
the Waitaki Catchment over twelve months (due the end of September 2005). 
46 
The Aoraki proceeding highlights first, the need to have clearly defined property 
rights in water which are not subject to interference by third parties. Meridian, faced with 
insecurity over the extent of its water rights was forced to litigate over the matter, leaving 
the judiciary to remedy the apparent defects of the RMA. Such a situation is unlikely to 
encourage investment in water resources if the perceived risks to the existence of water 
rights are greater than the perceived benefits of a investment. 
Secondly, Aoraki identifies the need to have in place mechanisms to allow the 
continued sustainability and transferability of water resources in the event that a resource 
is fully allocated. Following the outcome of the Aoraki decision, Aoraki and any other 
interested group could acquire water rights in the Waitaki Catchment only through 
41 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy lid, above n 32, para 28 Chisholm and Harrison JJ . 
42 The Court cited Fleetwing Farms lid v Marlborough District Council [ 1997] 3 NZLR 257 as authority 
for the ' first-in, first-served ' approach to water allocation . 
43 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy lid, above n 32, para 3 1 Chisholm and Harrison JJ (em phasis 
added). 
44 This was emphasised by Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer in the 2nd Reading of the Resource Management Bill 
(28 August 1990). 
45 Resource Management Act 1991 s 140. 
46 Ministry for the Environment "Waitaki Catchment" < http://www.mfe.govt.nz > (last accessed 14 July 
2005). 
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transfer of those rights under the RMA,47 however with no regional plan in existence, 
water could have potentially remained with existing users in a non-sustainable or low-use 
manner. 
2 Trade in water rights 
Whilst the RMA provides for the transfer of water permits (albeit in a limited 
sense),
48 
this has proven to have had little utilisation, perhaps through a lack of public 
knowledge of the ability to transfer permits, or the potential benefits of transfer, and the 
b d f , · 49 a un ance o water resources 111 many regions. 
An example of one of the few transfer schemes established under the RMA is in 
respect of the Oroua Catchment managed by the Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council. 
The scheme was fuelled by growing demand for water by irrigators and concerns 
over the effects of abstraction and pollution on water quality.50 A minimum flow regime 
has been established, whereby in periods of water scarcity the trade of water entitlements 
would be encouraged to promote the efficient reallocation of water. 51 The small 
geographical size of the Catchment, its limited number of users, and the diverse seasonal 
irrigational requirements of agricultural uses are the underlying reasons that the scheme 
was seen as feasible. 
52 
The Plan's success still remains to be seen but represents an 
example of how, and in what circumstances, trade in water might be realised under the 
RMA. 
Whilst water markets may be workable under the existing RMA framework 
through a more pro-active approach of promotion and public education by local 
47 
Transfers of water rights may only proceed under certain conditions under s 136 of the RMA. 
48 
Resource Management Act 1991 s 136. 
49 
Harris Consulting Property Rights in Water: A Review of Stakeholders ' Understanding and Behaviour 
Report Prepared for MAF Policy and Ministry for the Environment (November 2003 , Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington) 18. 
50 
Mike Kearney and Jim Skinner Transferable Water Permits Two Case Studies of the Issues MAF Policy 
Technical Paper 97/ l 2 (December 1997, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington) I 0. 
51 
Kearney and Skinner, above n 47, 11 . 
52 
Kearney and Skinner, above n 4 7, 11. 
II 
authorities, 53 it is necessary to first address security and clarity in those water rights 
before such a development can take place. 
54 For example, under the present regime, a 
consulting report prepared for the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) in 
November 2003 found that the quality of title for resource consents was hugely variable 
among regions.55 Conditions of use were alterable in the transfer of permits56 and in the 
granting of further consents upstream, the latter being highly likely to derogate from the 
rights of existing users. 57 This issue was of course emphasised in the discussion of Aoraki 
Water Trust v Meridian,58above. 
III COMPARATIVE REGIMES IN NATURAL RESOURCES 
A useful tool in helping to determine whether a property rights framework is 
necessary to ensure the efficient and sustainable allocation of our freshwater resources in 
New Zealand is to consider similar experiences of foreign jurisdictions. Here, the 
approach of the Australian states will be discussed. In addition, the establishment of a 
property rights for saltwater fisheries in New Zealand under the Fisheries Act I 986 (and 
subsequent Acts) will be examined as an example of the application of property rights to 
natural resources in a local context. 
A The Australian Approach to Water Rights 
Like New Zealand, Australian water law derives its origins from English common 
law. However, the need for legislative intervention to promote sustainability and efficient 
allocation mechanisms has been a significantly more pressing issue given the extreme 
climatic conditions on the continent. The exclusive rights to take, dam, and divert 
53 Ford, Butcher, Edmonds, & Braggins, above n 21, 19. 
54 Ford, Butcher, Edmonds, & Braggins, above n 21, 18. 
55 Kearney and Skinner, above n 47, 11. 
56 Ford, Butcher, Edmonds, & Braggins, above n 21 , 18. 
57 Harris Consulting, above n 46, 17. 
58 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd, above n 32. 
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freshwater were therefore placed in the Crown at a much earlier stage, for example, 111 
1886 by Yictoria,59 and in 1912 by New South Wales.60 
I The COAG reforms 
"[T]he need for property right arrangements to be put fully in place"61 was the 
principal submission of the 1994 Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which set 
the future policy direction for water reform in Australia. Whilst complete consistency 
between states in the form of entitlements was not seen as ultimately desirable, the COAG 
reforms sought to consolidate emerging state policies in respect of water rights. 62 
The aims of the reforms were to correct inefficiencies in water use, prevent 
further degradation of rivers, and promote better water use. 63 To achieve these objectives 
the proposed actions included: the separation of water rights from land title (primarily to 
facilitate trade); allocations for the environment; increased public consultation; and 
clearly specified allocations in terms of ownership, reliability, transferability, and 
volume.64 
All Australian states have subsequently taken steps to amend their legislative and 
administrative frameworks in the implementation of the COAG reforms. 65 Victoria 1s 
currently in the process of overhauling its legislative and administrative frameworks. 
59 
Productivity Commission Water Rights Arrangements in Australia and Overseas: Annex C: Victoria 
Commission Research Paper (2003 , Productivity Commission, Melbourne) 4. (Hereafter "Productivity 
Commission Annex C: Victoria") 
60 
Productivity Commission Water Rights Arrangements in Australia and Overseas: Annex B: New South 
Wales Commission Research Paper (2003, Productivity Commission, Melbourne) 6. (Hereafter 
"Productivity Commission Annex B: ew South Wales") 
61 
DE Fisher " Rights of Property in Water: Confusion or Clarity" 21 EPLJ 20~ 
62 
Brian Haisman Impacts of Water Rights Reform in Australia International Working Conference on Water 
Rights: Institutional Options for Improving Water Allocation ( 12-15 February 2003, Hanoi, Vietnam) 13 . 
63 
Poh-Ling Tan Diving into the Deep: Water Markets and the Law Paper presented to the Australian 
Institute of Public Affairs conference Establishing Australian Water Afarkets (August 2004, Institute of 
Public Affairs, Melbourne) I. 
64 
Chief Executive Officers ' Group on Water Report to the Council of Australian Governments (April 2003, 
Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council , Australia) para 14 . 
65 Poh-Ling Tan, above n 60, I. 
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A variety of allocation mechanisms are utilised by the Australian states, with all 
allocations granted initially by administrative means. Whilst some allocations remain 
attached to land (for example, stock and domestic use rights, and some water rights within 
irrigation districts) many allocations are now granted in the form of tradeable components 
separated from land title to facilitate trade. For example, in New South Wales water is 
allocated through a freely tradeable access component (specifying a rate of extraction or 
volume of water to be extracted), plus a use approval (specifying the use to which the 
water may be put at a particular location). 66 A similar situation exists in Queensland,
67 
and is proposed under the Victorian White Paper.68 
Bulk entitlements may be granted under some jurisdictions to electricity 
providers, urban water suppliers, or irrigation districts. In Victoria a bulk entitlement is 
capable of being allocated separately to an environmental use. 69 
Several Australian jurisdictions provide for a tiered system of priority in water 
rights. New South Wales, for example, gives priority in all but the most extreme 
circumstances to the environment and prioritises various types of licences. 70 The White 
Paper on water reform in Victoria (issued in June 2004) has the following approach to 
priority: first, rights held by the Crown assume paramount priority; secondly, allocations 
for the environment, authorities, tourism, and recreational values assume a mid-level 
priority; and thirdly, individually held rights including licences, irrigation rights, and 
consumptive rights assume the lowest priority.71 
The duration of water rights vanes between jurisdictions, with the duration of 
rights dependent on the perceived balance to be struck between encouraging security and 
66 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) ss 56, 89. 
67 Productivity Commission H'ater Rights Arrangements in Australia and Overseas: Annex D: Queensland 
(2003, Productivity Commission, Melbourne) 24. (Hereafter "Productivity Commission Annex D: 
Queensland") 
68 Victorian Government Department of Sustainability and Environment Securing Our Water Future 
Together: White Paper (June 2004, Departme11t of Sustainability and Environment) 44. (Hereafter 
" Victorian Government White Paper") 
69 Victorian Government White Paper, above ~1 65 44. 
70 Productivity Commission Annex 8: New So Wales. 
71 Victorian Government White Paper, above 1 65, 9. 
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meaningful investment, and ensunng the representation of social and environmental 
interests. Consequently, the Victorian White Paper proposes a 15-year review of all 
allocations with almost no prospect of variation or termination of allocations in between 
reviews, 
72 
whereas South Australia issues licences in perpetuity but subject to review at 
· 73 any t1111e. 
Despite the push for full property rights in water by the COAG reforms, there has 
yet to be any real recognition of a right to compensation when rights are reduced or 
terminated. Legislative recognition of a right to compensation exists only in New South 
Wales and Western Australia, and only in limited circumstances.74 
The environment as a legitimate user of water was expressly recognised by the 
COAG reform policy, 
75 
whereby provisions for the environment were required to be, 
"clearly and unequivocally defined and codified," prior to the establishment of tradeable 
water markets. 
76 
The majority of Australian jurisdictions do not however provide for 
separate allocations for the environment, but include environmental flow objectives within 
other al locations. 77 
New South Wales allows for environmentally specific allocations in limited 
circumstances,
78 
and , as mentioned, Victoria permits bulk entitlements for environmental 
uses. 
79 
Rejecting the placement of environmental conditions upon existing licences as 
effectively relegating the environment to the status of a residual consideration, the 
n Victorian Government White Paper, above n 65 , 29-30. 
73 
Water Resources Act (SA) s 29. 
74 
For example, under the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 Sch I cls 39( I), (2), and (5) (WA), 
substantially amended in 2000, compensation is payable ifa water licence is varied only if the pre-existing 
use was reasonable, authorised , consistent with the objects of the R WIA , and the effects of the exercise of 
the power are permanent, unfair, and unreasonable with respect to other licence holders in the area. 75 
atural Resource Management Standing Committee A National Approach to Water Trading (November 
2001, Natural Resource Ministerial Council, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra) para 7.2. 
76 
Natural Resource Management Standing Com 111 ittee, above n 71 , para 7 .2. 
77 
Productivity Commission Water Rights Arrangements in Australia and Overseas (2003 , Productivity 
Commission, Melbourne) 60 . 
78 
Water Management Act 2000 s 89 ( SW). 
79 
Victorian Government White Paper, above n 65 , 44. 
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Victorian White Paper proposes creating Water Reserves, that is, bulk shares allocated to 
the environment as a form of cap on water use.
80 
2 The Murray-Darling Basin 
The Murray-Darling Basin represents an example of a water rights transfer 
scheme within the largest surface water system in Australia. The Basin straddles five 
states 81 and is currently governed by the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 1992 (the 
Agreement), which determines each state's allocation to the water resource.
82 
In 1997, a cap on water consumption was agreed between the states in the 
promotion of active trade in water entitlements. 
83 Trade was further fuel led by the 
separation of land title to water rights in all jurisdictions, as proposed by the 1994 COAG 
reforms. In addition to trade within jurisdictions, the Murray-Darling Basin is also 
currently the centre of a Pilot Inter-State Water Trading Project, provided for under the 
Agreement.84 The project enables the permanent transfer of private water rights, with the 
object of increasing efficient allocations to high value uses, whilst at the same time 
protecting the environment. 85 
In this latter respect, a number of approaches have been trialled to internalise the 
environmental costs of water transfers within the water market. 
86 Such measures have 
included a type of ' exchange rate ' whereby, "[a] reduction in the actual volume of water 
80 Victorian Government Department of Sustainability and Environment Securing Our Wal er Future: 
Green Paper (August 2003, Department of Sustainability and Environment) 27. 
81 Productivity Commission /Va/er Righls Arrangemenls in Australia and Overseas: Annex A: Murray-
Darling Basin Commission Research Paper (2003, Productivity Commission, Melbourne) I. (Hereafter 
"Productivity Commission Annex A: Murray-Daring Basin") 
82 Productivity Commission Annex A: Murray-Daring Basin , above n 77, 14. 
83 Megan Dyson & John Scanlan Trading in Waler Enlillemenls in !he Murray-Darling Basin in Auslra/ia 
Rea/i:::ing !he Polenlia/for Environmenlal Benefi1s ? World Conservation Union <http://www.iucn .org>. 
84 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 1992 Sch E. 
85 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement Sch E cl l(c). 
86 Dyson & Scanlan, above n 79. 
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that can be taken is applied to transfers upstream in recognition of decreasing security of 
I ,,87 supp y ... 
Within the first two years of the Project' s implementation, the vast majority (some 
90%) of water transfers were to South Australia, 88 explained by South Australia's status 
as the driest of the Australian states whilst also having the highest value crops per volume 
of water consumed. 89 The environmental impact of the transfers has been said to be 
minimal given their small number, however, "from a salinity perspective and in the long-
run , inter-state trading can be expected to have a negative impact on river salinity."90 
The Murray-Darling Basin system is just one example of the concerted effo11 by 
the Australian authorities to enhance prope11y rights in water and encourage water 
transfers. The separation of water rights from land title has gone far in achieving these 
goals. 
Nevertheless, following the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Mabo v 
Queensland, 
91 
where native title was recognised by the common law of Australia, and 
Yanner v Eaton, 
92 
where customary hunting rights were found not to have been 
extinguished by the vesting of prope11y in fauna in the Crown, the closer examination of 
Aboriginal customary rights and ownership in natural resource regimes in Australia is 
I ikely to be inevitable. The consequences for this on the security of existing property 
rights may be significant, as illustrated by the New Zealand fisheries regime, below. 
87 Dyson & Scanlan , above n 79. 
88 
Mike Young, D_arla Hatton MacDonald, Randy Stringer, ~nd He~ning Bjo_rnl_upd Inter-State Water 
Trading· 11 Tl1'o } ear Review Prepared for the Murray-Dari mg Basm Comm1ss 611 (December 1000, 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australia) . (1 
89 
Dyson & Scanlan, above n 79. ,i:J.--
90 Young, Hatton MacDonald, Stringer, and Bjornlund, above n 84, 3. 
91 
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) ( 1992) 175 CLR I (HCA). 
92 
Vanner v Eaton [ 1999) H 53 (7 October 1999). 
I' 
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B The New Zealand fisheries regime 
The New Zealand fisheries framework provides a useful example of the 
establishment of a property rights regime in a natural resource, specifically here to 
provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring their continued 
sustainability. 93 
The Fisheries Amendment Act 1986, amending the Fisheries Act 1983, first 
introduced a Quota Management System (QMS) for the allocation of fisheries stocks in 
New Zealand. The current legislative regime (in a transitional phase between the 
Fisheries Act 1983 and the Fisheries Act 1996) is based upon an annual Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) set by the Minister.
94 
In setting the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC), the Minister is to have 
regard to non-commercial interests including those customary interests of Maori , and 
recreational interests.95 The TACC is then allocated personally in the form of Individual 
Transferable Quotas (JTQ ' s), comprised of a number of individually allocated shares.
96 
The number of shares (of equal value) allocated to a person are determined by that 
person ' s provisional catch history.
97 
Under the fisheries scheme ITQ ' s exhibit strong, but reduced, property 
characteristics in comparison with earlier legislation. ITQ 's are, and have been, 
98 
registered interests capable of being caveated,
99 mortgaged , 100 and transferred , 
101 with a 
93 Fisheries Act 1996 s 8( I). 
94 Fisheries Act 1996 s 13 . A component of the TAC is the Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC), set 
by the Minister under section 20 of the 1996 Act. 
95 Fisheries Act 1996 s 21 (I). 
96 In order to exercise the ITQ a fishing permit, or a high seas fishing permit , must be acquired by a user 
under section 89 and section 113G . 
97 Fisheries Act 1996 ss 32 and 47. 
98 The general characteristics of ITQ 's regarding tradeability, security, perpetuity, and their ability to be 
caveated, were set out under section 27 of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
99 Fisheries Act 1996 s 14 7. 
IOO Fisheries Act 1996 s 136. 
101 Fisheries Act 1996 s 132. Under section 132 subsection 2 however, a part of an ITQ is non-transferable, 
and under subsection 4 provisional individual transferable quotas are transferable only by operation of law. 
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certified copy of a record of ITQ deemed to be conclusive evidence of ownership. 102 Yet, 
since the passage of the Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999, rTQ's are no longer 
automatically issued in perpetuity. 103 
Under the Fisheries Act (and previous enactments) the Minister is clearly capable 
of diminishing rights in fisheries through the reduction of the TAC, which consequently 
reduces all ITQ's proportionately. 104 The effects of reduced TAC on rights holders are 
partially mitigated through the requirement that unencumbered shares owned by the 
Crown must be transferred proportionately to quota owners. 105 Further, as a creation of 
statute, the 'property' rights created by the fisheries legislation since 1986 are inherently 
susceptible to diminution and extinguishment without compensation, discussed further in 
respect of property rights generally, below. 
1 The fisheries regime and Maori 
The establishment of the QMS system for New Zealand fisheries in 1986 
coincided with the growth of legal and political assertion by Maori over the rights to 
access and manage their fisheries , guaranteed to them under Article II of the Treaty of 
Waitangi 1840.
106 
The milestone decisions of Te Wee hi v Regional Fisheries Officer, 107 
holding that Maori customary rights were preserved under the Fisheries Act 1983, and NZ 
Maori Council v AG, 108 combined with the QMS 's effective exclusion of part-time Maori 
fisherman , 
109 
laid the foundations for a Maori challenge to any Crown attempt to 
establish ownership rights in fisheries. 
102 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 168 . 
103 
Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 1999 s 85. Previously section 27 of the Fisheries Act 1996 had 
provided that ITQ ' s were issued in perpetuity. 
104 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 22. 
105 
Fisheries Act 1996 s 22( I). 
106 
Andrew Day Fisherie in New Zealand: The Maori and the Quota Management System Report Prepared 
for The First ation Panel on Fisheries (March 2004, First ation Panel on Fisheries, Vancouver) I . 
101 
Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986) I NZLR 680 (HC). 
108 
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-Genera/ [ 1987) NZLR 641 (CA). 
109 
Brookers Fisheries Law (Brookers , Wellington , 1995) Introduction para 0 .08( I) (Last updated 2 July 
2005). 
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In Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v AG, 1
1 0 several Maori applicants joined to seek 
injunctions against the Minister taking any further action in respect of the implementation 
of the QMS. 111 Greig J was satisfied that a strong case existed whereby Maori, before 
1840, had highly developed and controlled fisheries over the entire coastal area inhabited 
by them. 112 The Judge referred to Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer' 
13 and the 
Treaty of Waitangi in finding that the Crown was prevented from doing anything under 
the Fisheries Act 1983 to restrict those rights of Maori, 
114 and subsequently issued the 
injunctions sought. 
The result for Maori was the passage of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 as an 
interim solution by Government,
115 followed by the greater 'Sealord Deal ', under which 
Maori were to receive a 20 percent share of the annual quota whilst ensuring the 
continued recognition of customary fishing rights.
11 6 The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Claims) Settlement Act 1992 finalised the settlement, barring future Maori claims. 
The New Zealand fisheries regime is a clear example of the problems generated 
when attempting to create an economically efficient regime of property rights in a natural 
resource without first establishing unambiguous title and authority of the Crown to do 
so. 117 However, it has also been suggested that the forced dispute resolution between 
Maori and the Crown has been a positive outcome of the establishment of the QMS, 
which acted as a catalyst in active settlement and redistribution.
118 Whether Maori are 
satisfied with the outcomes of the QMS settlement though, is debateable. 
11 0 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v AG (2 ovember I 987) HC Wn Registry CP559/87, CP6 I 0/87, 
CP6 I 4/87, Greig J. 
111 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v AG, above n I 06 , 2 Greig J . 
112 Ngai Tahu A!aori Trust Board v AG, above n I 06, 6 Greig J. 
11 3 Te 11'eehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ I 986] I NZLR 680 (HC). 
114Ngai Tahu A!aori Trnst BoardvAG, above n 106, 8 Greig J. 
11 5 This Act established the Maori Fisheries Commission, which was to purchase I O percent of already 
allocated quotas under the QMS. Also created by the Act was Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd , a company created to 
utilise half of the purchased quotas . The remaining 50 percent of quotas were then leased on an annual 
basis , preferably to Maori fishermen. 
11 6 This is now recognised under the Fisheries Act 1996. Section 186 recognises customary rights of Maori , 
whilst section 44 recognises that Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Ltd is entitled to 20 per cent of quota. 
117 
Richard Boast "Maori Fisheries 1986 - 1998: A Reflection ( 1999) 30 VUWLR 111 , 134. 
118 Andrew Day Fisheries in New Zealand: The ,\laori and the Quota Afanagement System Report Prepared 
for The First Nation Panel on Fisheries (March 2004, First ation Panel on Fisheries, Vancouver) 7. 
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IV IS PROPERTY REQUIRED THOUGH? 
A Desirable characteristics of 'property' 
The Australian freshwater resources regime and the New Zealand saltwater 
fisheries regime have clearly recognised property rights as the most appropriate 
mechanism to achieve certain ends. These characteristics include exclusivity, alienability, 
flexibility, security of tenure, and transferability. 11 9 In pa11icular, it is suggested that 
economic efficiencies of enhanced trade between users whilst ensuring sustainability was 
the primary motivation in both cases. Despite a purported desire to create 'property' in 
these resources, both statutorily created regimes function in the absence of a right to 
compensation, a characteristic supposedly inherent in the concept of property. 
1 Economic benefits of trade and investment 
Aristotle, in 333 BC, wrote that, "when everyone has a distinct interest, men will 
not complain of one another, and they will make progress, because every one will be 
attending to his own business." 120 Aristotle's ideas still hold for those advocates of 
private property rights today. An illustration of this is the Australian experience above, 
where the paramount motivation for the creation of more secure rights in freshwater 
resources has been to promote the efficient transfer of rights from low value to high value 
uses.
121 
The perception has been that clearly defined rights of sufficient duration to allow 
for meaningful investment and separated from title to land , will best maximise social 
welfare. 122 
119 
Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin ' The Evolution of Water Rights" 35 at Res Jnl 821 , 823. 
120 
Jeremy Waldron " Property" in Edward Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2004 Edition) electronic access at <http ://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/property/> (last 
accessed 24 August 2005 ). 
121 Chief Executive Officers ' Group , above n 61 , para 14. 
122 
Dr John J Pigram Tradeable Water Rights: The Australian Experience Prepared for Centre for Water 
Policy Research , NSW (21 June 1999, Taiwan Institute for Economic Research , Taipei) 8. 
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Logically, the need for a market in trade for water rights will only arise in the 
situation of a fully allocated resource, property rights in those resources not fully 
allocated will be allocated through administrative means.
123 Similarly, a water right does 
not have to be classified as a pure property right to enable its transfer. This is of course 
the current state of affairs under the RMA in New Zealand.
124 More secure rights merely 
promote the efficiency of those transactions. 
However, the Australian pos1t1on advocating for the establishment of 'full ' 
property rights in water
125 is limited by the reality that a pure market approach to water 
allocation is infeasible, due to the need to account for environmental interests and 
particularly in the New Zealand context, the interests of Maori. The difficulties in 
establishing a system of property rights based solely on economic efficiencies has been 
clearly illustrated by the experience of creation of the Quota Management System in New 
Zealand fisheries, where it was legally uncertain as to whether the Crown was in fact able 
to allocate the resource at all.
126 
In respect of the environment, the Environmental Defender's Office (Australia) has 
d h · · h 127 expresse t e opinion t at: 
It is all very well to ... decide that wealth maximisation requires moving water to its highest value use, 
but this is essentially a one dimensional view ... It ignores the complicated effects of water extraction 
on other aspects of the environment and ignores cumulative and long term effects which are not 
adequately taken into account by market or property based mechanisms. 
Through the creation of secure property rights of significant duration and a 
presumption of renewal , the establishment of meaningful investment may provide a 
counter-weight to the effects of a market-based approach to water allocation . By 
minimising the risk of arbitrary interference by the state and third parties, holders of 
123 Kearney & Skinner, above n 47 , 9 . 
124 Resource Management Act 1991 s 136 . 
125 D E Fisher, above n 58. 
126 Richard Boast, above n 113, 134. 
127 Environmental Defender ' s Office Inland Rivers, Regulato,y Strategies for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development (Environmental Defender ' s Office, Melbourne, 1994) 123 . 
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water rights are provided with an incentive to seek to max1m1se benefits over time, 
requiring the promotion of the sustainability of the freshwater resource. 
Therefore, the creation of secure property rights in freshwater made be necessary, but 
not sufficient in balancing other societal interests with trade and investment. An 
integrated approach between regulatory and market mechanisms is desirable. 128 
2 Compensation for statutorily created property rights 
Compared to the benefits of trade and investment which may occur under 
reasonably secure property rights, the ability to claim compensation in the event that a 
property right is reduced or extinguished exists only in the highest form of property 
rights. In the New Zealand and Australian colonies, the common law did not recognise 
rights in water as property, and subsequently no claim for compensation existed. 129 The 
establishment of statutorily created rights in property therefore raises the important 
question of whether these rights are compensable in the absence of a statutory provision 
to that end. 
This issue has been discussed on several occasions in the High Court of Australia 
in terms of section 51 of the Australian Constitution, which provides that the Australian 
Parliament, "shall , subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to ... (xxxi) the 
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect 
of which the Par! iament has power to make laws." 
In Health Insurance Commission v Peverill, 130 the High Court found that the 
reduction of a statutorily created right to receive monetary benefits under the Health 
Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) was not an ' acquisition of property ' under section 51 (xxxi) of 
the Constitution. It was held that in the absence of any antecedent proprietary right, no 
0 
128 Poh-Ling Tan, above n 60, 5. 
129 Getzler, above n 4, 43. 
130 lleallh Insurance Commission v Peveri/1 ( 1993) 179 CLR 226 (HCA). 
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claim for compensation can exist in the event that a statutorily created right is reduced or 
extinguished. 131 Rights of that 'kind', it was said, "are inherently susceptible to 
variation." 132 
The reasoning m Peverill was subsequently applied to the natural resources 
context in Commonwealth v WMC Resources Pty Ltd,
133 where compensation was sought 
by WMC following the extinguishment of a petroleum exploration permit covering a 
section of the continental shelf. It was found that the rights possessed by WMC under the 
exploration permit had no existence except by a Commonwealth statute, 
134 and no 
compensable benefit or advantage was acquired by the Commonwealth upon 
extinguishment of the permit.
135 
WMC Resources was distinguished from the earlier decision of the Court in 
Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth, 
136 which had found that the extingu ishment 
of Newcrest's mining leases by legislation extending the Kakadu National Park had 
amounted to an acquisition of property by the Commonwealth. The basis for the 
distinction was that through the extinguishment of Newcrest's rights, the property of the 
Commonwealth was enhanced through the elimination of the Commonwealth's liability 
to have minerals extracted from its land. 
137 
In the New Zealand context, the issue of compensation for the deprivation of 
property rights in fisheries under the Quota Management System was examined by the 
High Court in Cooper v AG.
138 There, Baragwanath J noted that New Zealand has no 
equivalent protection of property rights to the Fifth Amendment of the US 
13 1 Health Insurance Commission v Peveri/1, above n I~, 237 Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ. 
132 Health Insurance Commission v Peveri/1, above h 126,23 7 Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ . 
133 Commonwealth v IVl\!IC Resources Pty Ltd ( 1998) 194 CLR I (HCA). 
134 Commonwealth v 11'MC Resources Pty Ltd, above n 129, 29 Toohey J. 
135 Commonwealth v WMC Resources Pty Ltd, above n I 29, 17 Brennan CJ, 38 Gaudron J. 
136 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth ( 1996) 190 CLR 513 (HCA). 
137 Commonwealth v ll'J\IC Resources Ply Ltd, above n 129, 17 Brennan CJ, 37 Gaudron J. 
138 Cooper vAG [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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Constitution. 139 This argument logically extends to section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian 
Constitution also. 
Baragwanath J found that New Zealand's constitutional safeguard of property 
rights was to be found under Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta, in which, "no freeman shal I 
be ... disseised of his freehold or liberties, or free customs ... but. .. by the law of the 
land." 140 The Judge went on to observe that in his opinion it would not be possible to 
argue that statutorily created rights could not be then taken away by statute. 141 This 
sentiment reflects the common law prerogative right of eminent domain possessed by the 
Crown, exercised in New Zealand predominantly under the Public Works Act 1981. 142 
Applied to the context of freshwater resources, although statutorily created rights 
m water may be classified as ' property', they are unlikely to attract a right of 
compensation upon their reduction or extinguishment under the reasoning of WMC 
Resources. Compared to the pre-existing right of the Crown in that case to the minerals in 
the land concerned, there were no equivalent rights possessed by the Crown in respect of 
the control of freshwater resources. Indeed, it was not until the passage of the Water and 
Soil Conservation Act 1967 that rights to take, use, and divert water were vested in the 
Crown, 143 and therefore any 'acquisition ' by the Crown of rights existing solely under 
statute would not confer any benefit on the Crown. 
Further, it has been argued that, in any event, compensation should not be payable 
upon the reduction or extinguishment of rights in water as a matter of policy. 144 By 
applying the reasoning inherent in the American Public Trust doctrine, public authorities 
are obliged to keep under review granted property rights, with the power to amend those 
rights in the public interest without the payment of compensation. 145 
m Cooper v AG, above n 134,483 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
14° Cooper v AG, above n 134, 483 (HC) Baragwanath J . 
141 Cooper v AG, above n 134,495 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
142 
Hinde, McMorland , and Sim , above n 3, para 1.024. 
143 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 s 21 (repealed). 
144 
Alex Gardner "Water Resources Law Reform in Western Australia - Implementing the COAG Water 
Reforms" 19( I) EPLJ 6 , 27. 
145 
Alex Gardner, above n 140, 27. 
25 
This seems to be the predominant approach taken in the Australian states. Apart 
from limited circumstances in Western Australia and New South Wales, 
146 compensation 
is not available for the reduction or extinguishment of rights in water, suggesting that the 
desire for ' full' property rights in water has yet to be realised and may even not be 
realised. In comparison, California, Colorado, and Chile all provide for a statutory claim 
· 147 to compensation. 
B 'Property' 
Whilst it is established that clearer and more secure rights in property appear to 
promote trade and investment, and may provide a right to compensation in some cases 
when those rights are reduced or diminished, it is necessary to consider whether a regime 
in 'property' is in fact vital to ensuring these desired outcomes. In this regard, it is first 
important to examine what is meant by the term ' property'. 
"The word 'property' is a word of the widest import," 148 and therefore one faces 
difficulties exacting any exhaustive meaning of the term. However, it is suggested that 
'property' is broadly a description of the exercise of a relative level of socially 
permissible power or control over a thing or a resource. 149 This approach is preferred to a 
more orthodox approach whereby a right in property must possess a set of exhaustive 
' characteristics' in order to be considered 'property' .150 
Whilst viewed by Sir William Blackstone in the Ith Century as, "that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the things of the world , 1n 
146 Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 2000 (WA) Sch I cls 39( I), (2) and (5) . 
147 Productivity Commission Water Rights Arrangements in Australia and Overseas (2003 , Productivity 
Commission, Melbourne) XIX 
148 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88, para 137 Callinan J. 
149 Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray "The Idea of Property in Land" in Susan Bright & John Dewar (eds) 
land law: Themes and Perspectives ( 1998, Oxford University Press , Oxford) 15. 
150 The classical judicial declaration of 'property ' was by Lord Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank v 
Ainsworth [ 1965] AC 1175, 124 7-8. There his Lordship held that, " before a right of an interests can be 
admitted to the category of property ... it must be definable, identifiable by third parties , capable in its 
nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability." 
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total exclusion of the right of any individual in the universe," 151 a more permissive 
approach to property recognises that there may well be gradations of ' property ', 
dependent upon the relative exercise of control and power over different things or 
resources. 152 This latter argument is particularly relevant in the context of natural 
resources, where varying societal interests may require a system of prioritised rights to a 
particular resource in order to be workable. 153 
The level of socially permissible power capable of being exercised over a piece of 
land, for example, has historically been large due to the societal perception of the 
impo11ance of private ownership, and remains significantly unregulated by the State 
today. Derived from the feudal doctrine of tenure, a fee simple (which in law is of course 
the largest form ofestate) 154 has the potential to have an unlimited duration of tenure, and 
exhibits characteristics including exclusivity, alienability, and enforceability against 
interference by third parties (for example, under the land-based torts of trespass and 
nuisance). 155 
Yet the control of rights in land by a landowner under a fee simple is not absolute. 
All titles in land are deemed to be derived either directly or indirectly from the Crown 
which retains a prerogative right of eminent domain , 156 and further, acting in the wider 
social interest the State may limit property rights in land through legislation. 
Examples of limitations of individual control over land in New Zealand include 
powers of entry of a dog control officer if an offence under the Dog Control Act is 
reasonably believed to have occurred, 157 the power of an enforcement officer to enter 
onto land if he or she has reasonable cause to suspect an offence has been committed 
151 
SN Katz (ed) ll'illiam Blackstone: Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the 1765-69 
4ed ( 1979, Chi cago University Press, Chicago) 2. 
is~ 
- Gray &Gray, aboven 144, 15 . 
153 
This is the view taken by several of the Australian jurisdictions discussed above. 
154 
Hinde, McMorland , and Sim , above n 3, para 1.029. 
155 
Hinde, McMorland , and Sim , above n 3, para 1.029. 
156 
Hinde, McMorland , and Sim , above n 3, para 1.024. 
157 
Dog Control Act 1996 s 14. 
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against the Land Transport Act 1998, 
158 the power of an owner of a drainage scheme for 
the purpose of operating and maintaining that scheme, 
159 and a gas meter-reader's power 
of entry under the Gas Act 1992.
160 Despite these limitations, the possessor of the right in 
land is still considered to have a right in 'property'. 
I Property in natural resources 
Whether or not 'property' exists in natural resources is a more complex question , 
as the level of control and power exercisable over natural resources has been inherently 
limited by reason of the divergent nature of those resources. An attempt to apply 
traditional paradigms of 'property' to resources such as wild animals, flowing water, and 
oil, natural gas, and air, has been a long recognised difficulty for they have, "little respect 
for property lines." 16 1 
At common law there was no form of absolute or full beneficial ownership in fire , 
light, air, water, and wild animals (the exploitation of oil and gas of course being a 
relatively recent phenomenon).
162 The approach of the common law was similar to earlier 
16' 
Roman law which deemed these resources, " by natural law common to all." ~ The 
rationale for this relaxed legal position was the abundance of supply of these resources 
which were capable of common use without conflict.
164 
The English common law npanan doctrine governed rights to freshwater 
resources, and was influenced in its development by the nature of water as a dynamic 
medium, capable of diversion, abstraction, and degradation. 
165 A landowner acquired 
riparian rights over surface water flow of a river ad medium jilem aquae (or to the 
158 Land Transport Act 1998 s I 19. 
159 Local Government Act 1974 s 5 l 7ZC. 
160 Gas Act 1992 s 50. 
161 Charles Donahue Jr, Thomas E Kauper, and Peter W Martin Property: An Introduction to the Concept 
and the Institution (3ed) ( 1993, West Publishing Co, St Paul , Minnesota) 244. 
162 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88 , para 24 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron , Kirby and Hayne JJ . 
163 J Moyle The Institutes of Justinian Translated into English (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913) 35. 
164 D E Fisher, above n 58, 203. 
165 Getzler, above n 4, 43. 
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'middle line ' of a river) , 166 and could take, divert, and dam water from a river 's natural 
flow, so long as it was effected, ''without sensible diminution or increase and without 
sensible alteration in its [that is , the river 's] character or quality." 167 Compared to wild 
animals, for example, riparian rights existed independently of possession by ' capture ', 
although of course water could also be appropriated by a riparian landowner. 168 
Like riparian doctrine, the common law position on minerals was not dependent 
on the 'capture ' of the resource. 169 Minerals were viewed as the property of the owner of 
the land situated above those minerals under the doctrine cujus est solum ejus est usque 
ad coelum (whereby a landowner owns everything under the sky down to the centre of 
the earth). 170 Unlike riparian doctrine however, a landowner seeking to extract minerals 
was not generally required to act with consideration to third party interests, and was 
limited only by the prerogative right of the Crown to the ownership of all gold and 
silver. 171 
2 Statuto,y vesting of property in natural resources 
Natural resources have become increasingly regulated by the state as a reflection 
of the social interest and the need to account for externalities in the sustainability and 
management of these resources. In New Zealand, the exclusive rights to take, divert, and 
dam flowing water resources are vested in Crown. 172 Further, all petroleum, gold, silver, 
and uranium in land is deemed the property of the Crown, 173 as are all wild animals until 
they are lawfully killed , taken, or held by a person .174 
166 Hinde, McMorland, and Sim, above n 3, para 2.232. 
167 Young v Bankier Distille1y Co [ 1893] AC 691, 698-699 (HL) Lord Macnaghten. 168 
Bryan Clark "M igratory Things on Land: Property Rights and a Law of Capture" 6(3) EJCL I 7-8. I ~ 
' Bryan Clark, above n 162, 12 . 
170 
Hinde, McMorland, and Sim, above n 3, para 12 .0008. 
171 
Hinde, McMorland, and Sim, above n 3, para 12.0008 . 
m Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 s 21 (repealed and replaced by the Resource Management Act 
1991 ). 
173 Crown Minerals Act 1991 s 10. 
174 Wild Animal Control Act 1977 s 9( I). 
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The effect of these statutory deeming provisions on 'property' in natural resources 
has been examined by the Australian High Court in the case of Yanner v Eaton.
175 There, 
the Court was required to determine the Crown's proprietary interest in fauna under 
section 7( I) of the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld) (since repealed), which 
provided: 176 
All fauna, save fauna taken or kept otherwise than in contravention of this Act during an open 
season with respect to that fauna , is the property of the Crown and under the control of the Fauna 
Authority. 
Finding that the Crown did not possess full beneficial or absolute ownership in 
fauna under the legislative provision , 
177 the majority found that the statutory vesting of 
' property' in fauna in the Crown may be viewed as, "nothing more than 'a fiction 
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have the power 
to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."' 
178 
The Crown's interest in exercising power and control over fauna represented a 
form of guardianship over a socially significant resource, 
179 but also from a policy 
perspective extended to benefits received by the Crown of exacting royalties and 
penalties under the provisions of the legislation. 
The reasoning of the Court in Yanner v Eaton has also been applied to the 
freshwater context in Australia, whereby the provisions vesting exclusive rights to take, 
use, dam, and divert water resources are considered to merely grant the Crown a right of 
primary access to publicly manage water resources, rather than to vest absolute beneficial 
h. . h C 180 owners 1p in t e rown. 
175 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88. 
176 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88, para 8 Gleeson CJ , Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ . (Emphasis added) The 
Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) has replaced the Fauna Conservation Act 1974 (Qld), providing under 
section s 83 that , "all protected animals are the property of the State." 
177 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88, para 22 Gleeson CJ , Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 
178 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88 , para 28 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron , Kirby and Hayne JJ. 
179 Yanner v Eaton, above n 88 , para 29 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron , Kirby and Hayne JJ (with reference to 
Roscoe Pound) . 
180 DE Fisher Water law (2000 , LBC, Sydney) 91. 
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It is evident that different levels of state control will exist in respect of different 
natural resources, demonstrated in the High Court of Australia ' s decision in Western 
Australia v Ward. 181 There, the Court found that the Crown's property in minerals was 
not merely ' guardianship ', but full dominium. 182 In such a case the reduction or 
extinguishment of a right in minerals would entail compensation under the reasoning of 
,. , Lr· . C 1s1 1vewcrest 1v11mng o. 
Despite the ability of the Crown to reduce or extinguish statutorily created 
' guardianship' rights without the payment of compensation, the Court in WMC Resources 
v Commonwealth, 184 nevertheless found there that the statutorily created right constituted 
'property ' . In fact, this was not disputed between the parties. 185 This strengthens an 
argument that rights in natural resources are fundamentally different from non-statutory 
rights, 186 but may still be considered 'property ' on a graduated sliding scale of relative 
levels of permissible social control over various resources. 
Recognising that the application of ' pure ' property rights to freshwater resources 
is unworkable (due to the need to account for societal interests), it is submitted that, in the 
promotion of the efficient allocation and trade of freshwater resources among users , 
rights in property become increasingly necessary as resources are subject to greater 
demand and degradation. Provided that rights are clearly defined, a workable system is 
possible with relatively abundant freshwater resources, as currently demonstrated under 
the RMA. 
187 
However, elements of property rights, particularly quality of title and 
transferability do become increasingly vital as competition increases over freshwater 
resources and those resources reach full allocation . 
181 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 191 ALR I . 
182 
Western Australia v Ward, above n 175, 113-4 Gleeson CJ , Gaudron, Gum mow, and Hayne JJ . 183 That reasoning suggests that if a valuable benefit is ' acquired ' by the Crown in reducing or 
extinguishing a statutorily created right, it will be compensable. 
184 Commonwealth v 11',\!C Resources Ply Ltd, above n 129. 
185 Commonwealth v 11 'A!C Resources Ltd, above n 129, 27 Toohey J. 
186 Chief Executive Officers ' Group, above n 61 , para 13. 
187 
Leaving aside the express provision that resource consents are not real or personal property under 
section 122, it is of course arguable that rights under the RMA already demonstrate proprietary attributes 
including transferability and permanence, for example. 
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V A PROPERTY RIGHTS FRAMEWORK IN NEW ZEALAND? 
A Interests to be Balanced 
As already alluded to in the context of the environment and indigenous rights, the 
creation of a framework for property rights must adequately account for a number of 
interests. These include the interests of consumers, of industry (including irrigation and 
other agricultural uses), and recreational users for example. Environmental considerations 
include maintaining visual amenity, water quality, and minimum flows, protecting flora 
and fauna, and controlling sedimentation and erosion . 
In the New Zealand context, the unique relationship between Maori and the 
Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 warrants separate consideration, especially in 
light of the limited recognition such interests have received in the jurisdictions of 
Australia and the United States, for example. 188 
1 Maori Interests in Freshwater Resources 
The unique relationship between Maori and the Crown under the Treaty of 
Waitangi 1840 (the Treaty) is of special significance in the ownership and management 
of natural resources. Article I of the Maori version of the Treaty provides that Maori 
ceded "te Kawanatanga katoa," or the governance over their land, 
189 and Article 11 
provides that Maori are guaranteed, ''te tino rangatiratanga o ratou wenua o ratou kainga 
me o ratou taonga katoa," or the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their 
lands, villages, and treasures. 190 Under the English version, Article I of the Treaty Maori 
leaders gave the Queen, "all the rights and powers of sovereignty over their land." whilst 
188 Currently the extent of legislative recognition for indigenous interests in Australia is limited to the 
ative Title Act I 993 in New South Wales . Some recognition of indigenous interests is recognised in the 
' planning stage of allocations of n1ost Australian states. In the United States, Federal Reserve rights confer 
fixed water allocations upon Native American Indians with the creation of a reservation. 
189 Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (Maori Version) Article I. 
190 Treaty ofWaitangi 1840 (Maori Version) Article II. 
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Article II guaranteed Maori, "full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and 
estates, forests, fisheries and other prope11ies." 191 
In resolving the apparent textual ambiguities of the Treaty, the international law 
principle of contra proferentem provides that when a when a text is ambiguous, it must be 
construed against the party who drafted it, in this case the English. 192 Under this principle 
Maori cede Kawanatanga (governance), but retain te tino rangitiratanga (chieftainship) 
over their lands, villages, and treasures. 
(a) Maori ownership of natural resources 
This importance of the contra proferentem rule of treaty interpretation for Maori 
in the context of the ownership and management of natural resources is significant, and 
raises the real question of whether Maori property rights can be harmonised with private 
property rights. The determination of ownership of resources as a priority for Maori has 
been effectively sidelined by the Crown in the passage of the RMA, and completely 
ignored in the establishment of the QMS of private property rights in fisheries. 193 It was 
inevitable that litigation was to follow by Maori seeking to protect their claims to 
ownership and rights of management over resources, and the same situation is more than 
likely to reoccur if freshwater resources are made subject to private property rights. 194 
Already in freshwater resources, the Waitangi Tribunal has made several 
significant decisions concerning the need for the Crown to recognise Maori ownership of 
those resources. In the Whanganui River Report, 195 for example, it was found that, "in 
Maori terms, the Whanganui River is ... a single and indivisible entity, which was owned 
in its entirety by Atihaunui in 1840." 196 Breaches of the Treaty by the Crown included the 
191 Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (English Version) Article II. 
192 Lord McNair The Law of Treaties (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961) 464. 
I 9J Morris Te hiti Love "Ten Years of the Resource Management Act for Maori" Speech delivered to the 
Resource Management Law Association , Auckland Branch (Resource Management Law Association , 
Auckland, 6 December 200 I) . 
194 Richard Boast, above n 113 . 
195 Whanganui River Report Wai 167 (GP Publications, Wellington , 1999). 
196 11'hanganui River Report, above n 191 , 337. 
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deprivation of the Atihaunui of their possession and control of the river, and the failure to 
protect the rangitiratanga of Atihaunui over the river. Consequently, the Tribunal 
recommended for the Crown recognition of Atihaunui control and ownership in any 
settlement reached. 197 
Before any property regime is established in freshwater resources in New Zealand 
therefore, Maori claims to ownership of those resources must first be determined. 198
 In 
the absence of a prior determination of ownership rights, the Crown is likely to be in 
breach of the Treaty of Waitangi and will be forced to settle Maori grievances in a similar 
fashion to the fisheries example. This is clearly undesirable. 199 
(b) Maori interests under the RMA 
In the context of the management of freshwater resources, the RMA of course 
refers to the relationship of Maori and their culture with water, waahi tapu, and other 
taonga,200 and the protection of recognised customary activities20 1as matters of national 
importance, the concept of kaitiakitanga (stewardship) as a matter in which decision 
makers must have particular regard, and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi202 which 
must be taken into account in achieving sustainable development under the RMA.203 
197 Whanganui River Report, above n 191,347. 
198 This view was expressed by Maori in Wai Ora: Report of the Sustainable Water Programme of Aclion 
Consultation Hui (July 2005, Ministry for the Environment, Wellington) 7. 
199 Unless of course the perspective of Andrew Day is promoted. However, this merely encourages Crown 
breaches of the Treaty and creates forced settlements which may be unsatisfactory for all parties concerned. 
100 Resource Management Act I 991 s 6( e). 
20 1 Resource Management Act 1991 s 6(g). 
202 These principles were first elucidated non-exhaustively in the decision of the Court of Appeal in /\'Z 
Maori Council v Attorney General [ 1987] NZLR 641 (CA). There, the Court said that the Treaty of 
Waitangi envisaged the principles of partnership and good faith (seep 664 per Cooke J) , as well as the 
Crown's duty to govern (see pp 665-6 per Cooke J; p 716 per Bisson J), provide active protection of Maori , 
and remedy past breaches (seep 664 per Cooke J) The possibility of a principle of consultation was 
discussed , but sidelined due to perceived practical difficulties in drawing the parameters of such a principle 
(see p 683 per Richardson J). 
203 Resource Management Act 1991 s 8. 
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In this respect, Judge Whiting in Ngati Rangi Trust v Manawatu-Wanganui RC,204 
found that, in taking into account Maori interests under the RMA, a balancing exercise is 
required with other competing interests to enable the overarching purpose of 
sustainability to be achieved.205 In that case, Maori of the Whanganui River claimed that 
diversion of the River ' s waters by the Tongariro Power Development scheme was 
culturally offensive and debilitating to its people, both physically and spiritually. In 
reducing Genesis Energy's resource consent from a 35-year to a I 0-year duration, the 
Judge recognised Maori spiritual and cultural interests, whilst at the same time 
accounting for the "s ignificant contribution" the power scheme made to hydro-electric 
power production in New Zealand.206 
The implication of the decision in Ngati Rangi Trust for the creation of a property 
rights regime in freshwater resources is that the need to take into account the interests of 
Maori may reduce the security of those rights. A proposed transfer, mixing, or diversion 
I 
of a water source may be rendered infeasible if offended Maori cultural and spiritual 
values are not outweighed by competing interests, for example. The Draft Waitaki 
Catchment Water Allocation Regional Plan goes even further than this, providing that the 
mixing of waters within the Waitaki Catchment would be encouraged only if there are no 
significant adverse effects upon the cultural values of tangata whenua.207 
Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the author that, provided ownership to resources 
1s established, private property rights in freshwater resources may co-exist with the 
preservation of Maori customary rights and those matters existing under the RMA. Whilst 
property rights may be weaker, it is imperative that those Maori interests continue to be 
recognised. 
204 
Ngati Rangi Trust v Manaivatu-Wanganui RC ( 18 May 2004) A067/2004 Environment Court Auckland 
Judge Whiting. 
205 Ngati Rangi Trust v Manaivatu-Wanganui RC, above n 193 , para 40 I Judge Whiting. 
206 !l'gati Rangi Trust v Afanai1•atu-11'anganui RC, above n 193 , para 65 Judge Whiting. 
207 Draft Waitaki Catchment Water Allocation Regional Plan (February 2005) Policy 9. 
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B The Water Programme for Action 
The less than desirable outcomes of the Waitaki Catchment proceedings in late 
2004 were of large influence on the Government's proposed reconsideration of the 
allocation of freshwater resources in New Zealand. The Water Programme for Action 
(WPA) was released by the Ministry for the Environment (MFE) in late 2004, comprising 
of thirteen proposed actions supported by Cabinet.
208 
These actions include: developing national policy statements and environmental 
standards; creating special mechanisms for regional councils (including powers to 
progressively constrain existing consents in the case of over-allocated or degraded 
freshwater resources); enhancing the transfer of allocated water between users (a pilot 
registry system for recording transfers is suggested in this respect); enhancing Maori 
participation in national and regional planning; developing an ability for regional councils 
to allocate water to priority uses by hearing applications for consents upon a comparative 
basis (rather than on a ' first-come, first-served' basis) ; and allowing regional councils to 
utilise market mechanisms in the allocation of water (for example, by a tendering or 
auctioning process).209 
In order to realise these actions, legislative amendments are suggested in respect 
of establishing priorities to water use and powers to progressively constrain existing 
consents in the case of over-allocated or degraded water resources.
2 10 However, notably 
absent from the WPA is any mention whatsoever of a belief that full property rights in 
water resources are necessary to implement the proposed actions. 
208 Cabinet Paper "Water Programme for Action - Consultation on Policy Direction" ( 15 December 2004) 
POL(04)320para 18. 
209 Cabinet Paper, above n 197, para 18 . 
21° Cabinet Paper, above n 197, para 19. 
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C Does New Zealand Require Proper(v Rights in Freshwater Resources? 
In the absence of the determination of ownership of New Zealand's natural 
resources, it is suggested that a framework in property rights for freshwater resources is 
undesirable and will most likely result in breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. Even in the 
event that ownership to natural resources is determined, 'full ' property rights in water are 
untenable, as traditional ' property' paradigms in this sense resist application to natural 
resources given the interdependence of users and the overarching societal interest. 
If one accepts that there may be gradations of control and power, and 
consequently ' property ', in a resource, then New Zealand would benefit from greater 
property rights in freshwater water in regard to higher security and certainty of those 
rights (but such rights are not essential in the present state of relatively abundant 
freshwater resources). However, in the absence of a determination of ownership of those 
resources, it is suggested that the current legislative framework be largely retained , with 
minor legislative amendments bolstered by greater administrative involvement in 
enhancing efficient water allocation. In this respect, the WPA appears to be a step in the 
right direction. 
By hearing applications for resource consents on a comparative basis and through 
the utilisation of market mechanisms, the potential inefficiencies of allocation of water 
rights under the present ' first in , first served ' scheme may be avoided. After the initial 
grant of a resource consent however, encouraging further efficient allocation of water 
rights through transfer mechanisms requires rights to be clearly defined and secure. A 
sufficient level of ' property ', or control and enforceability, in the resource is necessary. 
The adoption of a pilot registry would be beneficial in this regard, specifying the 
particulars of a right in terms of duration , exclusivity, alienability, rates or volumes of 
extraction, and any limiting conditions upon the right. 
The re-allocation of water from low value uses to high value uses is achievable 
under the current legislation given the permissive nature of local authorities ' discretion 
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under section 136 of the RMA.211 Water rights are issued separately from land title, and if 
approached on a catchment-by-catchment basis, regional authorities have an important 
role in the establishment of trading schemes. The Murray-Darling Basin is a useful 
example of such a scheme operating in practice. 
Possible legislative intervention may include the creation of temporary transfers 
(to allow for seasonal variations) 212 and separate components of water permits (for 
example, separate access and use components). 213 However, in the absence of more 
secure rights, the provision of information to users, under-allocated resources, and the 
promotion of water trading by regional bodies, trading will remain limited. 
Whilst it is necessary to enhance proprietary interests in water rights to facilitate 
trade, property rights in natural resources must cater for the internalisation of 
externalities, particularly with respect to the environment. The creation of a statutory 
power to progressively limit water rights to a fully allocated resource is desirable for the 
protection of the environment, as is establishing the environment as a priority user of 
water resources. 214 Although minimum environmental flows provide some security for 
the environment, the approach of Victoria in the creation of bulk environmental 
entitlements would see environmental interests being regarded as more than residual 
concerns of individual permit holders. 
In addition, the reduction or extinguishment of statutorily created property rights 
does not entail a right to compensation, 
215 posing a formidable hurdle in the 
establishment of complete security in water rights. Through more efficient allocation 
2 11 This of course has been achieved under regional plans, seen in respect of the Oroua Catchment as 
discussed , and is under consideration in the Draft Waitaki Catchment Allocation Regional Plan. 
212 Ministry for the Environment Water Programme of.1ction: Water . I/location and Use Technical 
Working Paper (June 2004, Ministry for the Environment, Wellington) para I 0.9. 1. 
2 13 An aspect that can be drawn from the experience of the Australian jurisdictions as a response to the 
COAG reforms. 
214 Both actions of course proposed under the Water Plan for Action and also seen in New South Wales , for 
example. 
215 In this regard refer to the discuss ion regarding compensation for statutorily created rights , above at Part 
IV A 2. 
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mechanisms however, the need for drastic alteration to resource consents would be 
reduced and kept to a minimum. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined whether New Zealand should adopt a property rights 
framework to provide for the allocation of freshwater resources. To help determine this 
question the current legislative regime under the RMA was examined, as was the 
Australian experience in water rights, and the New Zealand fisheries regime as a further 
example of the creation of property rights in natural resources. 
It was found that property is essentially a concept relating to the exercise of a 
permissible level of control or power by a person over a thing. In the context of natural 
resources, only a limited amount of control was historically exercised by the Crown, 
however the realisation that natural resources are necessarily finite has seen natural 
resources placed under the control of private entities to promote sustainability in the 
greater social interest. Yet through the Crown's retention of the prerogative right of 
eminent domain in the absence to a right for compensation under statutorily created 
rights, the application of a traditional paradigm of ' property ' to natural resources has 
been significantly hampered . 
In addition, externalities created by private property rights regimes require 
internalisation, particularly in respect to the environment. This necessarily imposes a 
limitation on the extent to which a right in freshwater resources may be considered 
property, yet through the establishment of priorities of water use and clear minimum 
water flows and standards, rights may still remain sufficiently secure. 
In the New Zealand situation, it has been illustrated through the discussion of the 
property rights regime in fisheries , that before the Crown may divest control of resources 
to private entities, ownership of those resources must first be determined. In the fisheries 
example, the Crown did not in fact possess the control of the natural resource, and 
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through privatisation of the resource rendered itself subject to Treaty claims by Maori and 
forced settlement. Such a result is likely if the same path is pursued by the Crown in 
respect of freshwater resources . 
It is concluded therefore that the establishment of property rights to freshwater 
resources in New Zealand first requires the settlement of Maori claims under the Treaty 
to ownership of those resources. Nevertheless, the establishment of property rights may 
not even be necessary or desirable in the present situation, if the current legislative 
framework can be adapted to provide greater security in existing rights. However, by 
attributing the level of control that ' property ' confers to a right in water, and the 
allocation of water resources by market mechanisms on a comparative basis rather than 
by a ' first in , first served ' practice, the economic benefits of increased investment and 
trade will best be recognised. 
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